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The eastward enlargement, or, expansion of the European Union (EU) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), respectively, is likely to transform 
the political and economic landscape of Europe.1 Yet there has been little 
analysis of the relationship between the two parallel processes. Instead, two 
separate literatures approach eastward enlargement from different angles. The 
literature on accession to the EU focuses primarily on more institutional, formal 
agreements and procedures, and less on the politics of the accession process.2 
Indeed, there has been little attention to the politics of European enlargement, 
that is, how it came about.3 The question is important because neither EU 
enlargement nor NATO expansion was clearly envisioned in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War. The EU had taken steps, with the Single European 
Act, the common market project of ’Europe 92’ and the Maastricht Treaty, to 
deepen European integration; many saw the potential of widening to a group of 
‘fragile democracies’ in the East as undesirable if not destabilising.
The somewhat more lively political and academic debate over NATO 
expansion has tended to revolve around the question of whether this move 
eastward will recreate the division of Europe or bring greater peace and stability 
to a fragmented region.4 In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, western 
publics were questioning why NATO, as a defensive alliance set up to contain 
the Soviet Union, was even necessary or relevant in the absence of its Cold War 
enemy. Many, at the time, assumed that the more comprehensive Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) would provide the framework for 
future security co-operation in a larger Europe, including Russia (Havel 1991: 
35).
As a result, one can question how and why the expansion of both 
institutions is proceeding despite questions about the material interest in doing
1 We would like to thank William Wallace and Jan Zielonka for encouragement to move 
ahead with the project. Antje Wiener would like to thank the Politics Group at Nuffield 
College for providing access to logistics and the opportunity to carry out joint-work with 
Karin Fierke at Nuffield in the Summer of 1999. The article has previously been presented at 
the University of Aarhus workshop on Constructivism and European Integration at Fenmpller, 
Denmark, June 1998, and the British International Studies Association meeting at the 
University of Sussex, December 1998. We would like to thank the participants for comments. 
Specifically we would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, as well as Knud Erik 
Jorgensen, Véronique Pin-Fat, Jeff Checkel, Frank Schimmelfennig, Thomas Diez and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier for concise comments. The responsibility for this version is ours.
2 See: Avery and Cameron 1998, Grabbe and Huges 1998, Mayhew 1998, Preston 1997; for 
conceptual work see: Schimmelfennig 1998 and Sedelmeier 1998
3 For an exception see: Sedelmeier 1998
4 See: Brown 1995; MccGwire 1998; Mandelbaum 1996, and Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee 



























































































so and in the face of an increasingly negative public opinion.5 In other words, 
why does it appear to have become ‘inevitable’ to the actors involved in 
enlargement politics? The empirical question relates to a larger theoretical issue 
about how organisations know their interests and how these interests are 
transformed.
Based on the observation that the existence of the Union’s acquis 
communautaire provides a normative basis for expansion eastward,6 
constructivists have argued that enlargement of one of the institutions, the EU, 
can more readily be explained by normative considerations than in terms of 
objective interests (Schimmelfennig 1998). In this respect, a difference between 
the two institutions is apparent. Enlargement has been at the heart of the 
European Community’s (EC) identity from the start. There have been a range of 
accessions to the EC, and now EU since it began with the original six in 1957. In 
the process the EU has defined itself as a ‘widening’ organisation in so far as 
any ‘democratic nation’ of Europe was a potential member. The acquis 
communautaire provides an important normative basis for enlargement, 
although the current potential is qualitatively different in scope than past 
accessions, which have only involved a few countries at a time. Eastern 
expansion could incorporate up to fifteen new countries, which is double the 
current membership, and is likely to dramatically transform the institutions of 
the community.
NATO, by contrast, lacks any formal equivalent of the aquis. While the 
idea of adding new members is not by definition in conflict with alliance 
formation, the expansion of NATO, as a Cold War alliance, had been largely 
unthinkable. In contrast to the classical European balance of power, 
characterised by states continuously joining or leaving alliances, the nuclear 
stand-off between the two superpowers froze a particular pattern of allegiance in 
place; in that context, a request by Poland to join NATO could have provided 
the impetus for nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, and the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union, this concern has faded. The key issue for the
5 See for example public opinion changes which show an increased scepticism towards 
NATO enlargement. Surveys of the US Information Agency show that, while in 1996 
majorities of 56% in France, 61% in Germany, and 66% in Britain welcomed enlargement, 
these percentages changed significantly to 39% in France, 38% in Germany and 42% in 
favour of NATO enlargement in 1997. (See: European Opinion Alert, US1A Office of 
Research and Media Reaction, 7.2.97, c.f. Statewatch, DB2WEB 2.10, 1998).
6 The acquis communautaire or, the shared properties of community law and legislation has 
come to be the guiding framework for enlargment procedures in particular (Michalski 1992). 
Indeed, the accession acquis has been identified as the oldest form of acquis, entailing "the 
whole body of rules, political principles and judicial decisions which new Member States 
must adhere to, in their entirety and from the beginning, when they become members of the 




























































































alliance is less one of adding new members than whether it is possible to do so 
without drawing clear boundaries between those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the 
alliance. As an alliance defined in defensive terms, NATO’s central task - and 
that of alliances historically - has been one of protecting the sovereignty of 
individual states. Subsequently security practice has involved the drawing of 
clear boundaries, specifying who was protected by the American security 
guarantee and who was outside. The current challenge is to expand without 
reviving Cold War tensions or recreating a division of Europe. The purpose of 
the organisation is now being defined less in terms of defence than providing an 
anchor of stability. This raises fundamental questions about the meaning of 
security and NATO’s identity as a security organisation.
The difference between the two organisations only highlights the question 
of how the parallel processes of expansion became possible. Our argument 
relates both processes of expansion to the social construction of European 
identity during the Cold War. We seek to demonstrate that, in that context, both 
organisations developed a specific western identity that was embedded in the 
construction of shared democratic norms. Crucially, these norms were the result 
of both social practices, and the definition of the democratic western political 
order, as different from the communist eastern political order. The East was 
therefore an important reference point for the social construction of western 
Europe. As this article will demonstrate, the post-Cold War context poses a 
dramatic challenge to this identity that is most clearly demonstrated by the 
respective enlargement processes. Now, the eastern Europeans, previously the 
West’s Other, seek membership in western organisations. In this respect, the 
empirical question relates to a larger theoretical issue about how institutional 
identities and interests are transformed.
The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 explores the theoretical 
question at the core of the rationalist-constructivist debate as it relates to NATO 
and EU expansion. Section 2 builds a theoretical argument about the relationship 
between speech acts, norm construction and institutional interests. Section 3 





























































































1. THE THEORETICAL QUESTION
A rational approach to interests or preferences might proceed as follows. If we 
assume that the preferences or interests of actor A are X, that is, if we takes 
these preferences as given, we can expect a particular outcome. For instance, if 
the EU, in the late 1980s, had an interest in deepening, as opposed to widening, 
we could expect outcome that would contribute to the realisation of this interest. 
Rationalists make an argument that given a set of preferences or interests we can 
anticipate certain rational outcomes. The problem, in this case, is not to explain 
outcomes given a set of stable preferences; rather it is to gain some insight into 
the changing identity and interests of NATO and the EU. We therefore approach 
the problem from a slightly different angle than the rationalists. Rationalists take 
the context as given; we want to problematise the context. Rather than taking the 
rules of any particular game for granted, and focusing on the rationality of 
decisions within an assumed context, we want to elaborate on the context itself 
within which the changing identities and interests of both organisations were 
invested with social and political meaning. To do so, we suggest elaborating on 
a Wittgensteinian constructivist approach (see: Christiansen et al. in this issue).
Constructivists have challenged the rationalist assumption of exogenously 
given interests, arguing that interests are constructed in historically specific 
circumstances, that is, a context of social and cultural norms shapes actor 
identity and behaviour.7 Consistent with this assumption we explore interest 
formation and change in the process of eastern enlargement. We ask how and 
why eastern expansion became part of the policy agenda despite serious doubts, 
in the early aftermath of the Cold War, that expansion was in the interest of 
either organisation. However, while sociological constructivists such as, for 
example, Emmanuel Adler (1997) and Alexander Wendt (1992) have explored 
the nature of changing games, and of the reconstitution of identities and 
interests, we argue that in these constructivist accounts, meanings are 
instrumentally deployed by rational actors or rationality appears to be prior to 
the development of any shared context of meaning. For instance, Wendt’s 
analysis of the first encounter between alter and ego emphases the rational cost- 
benefit calculations of the two players. Alter and ego begin without a common 
language or history but possess a desire to survive and certain material 
capabilities. Through a process of signalling and interpreting, alter infers the 
costs and probabilities that ego’s intent is malign or friendly. Wendt focuses on 
an originary situation, prior to the development of any kind of relationship and is 
therefore not easily adapted to a situation where alter and ego have a past and 
are, therefore, already embedded in a context of social interactions. Others have,
7 For a more in depth elaboration on the distinction between various strands of constructivist 
approaches in IR, see Christiansen, Joergensen and Wiener in the forthcoming in Journal of 




























































































by contrast, pointed out that encounters ’’Always take place in a context wherein 
traces of prior meanings and representations are already in place and become 
interwoven in new experiences” (Doty 1997: 387) arguing that it is a priori 
meanings that constrain reasoning about the other not an a priori rationality.
In this paper we seek to demonstrate that a sociological constructivist 
approach provides only limited understanding of the current enlargement 
process. For instance, EU enlargement can in part be explained by the 
commitment to widen to other democratic states in Europe. This commitment is 
embodied in the aquis communautaire, that is, the legal provisions, procedures 
and rules of the Treaty of European Union. Enlargement fits within the shared 
norms of the Union, and these norms have a stronger pull than ‘objective’ 
interests. There are two problems with this argument, however. First, the 
institutionalist argument begs the question of why the rules and norms of the 
acquis communautaire would override other interests? Second, if NATO, as an 
institution that lacks the formal equivalent of the acquis communautaire, is also 
expanding the explanation must in part be identified elsewhere. Given the 
parallel processes of expansion we subsequently raise a question about the role 
of another level of norms shared by the two organisations, which may be 
propelling the expansion process.
In sum, while we share the sociological constructivist observation that the 
EU's interest in enlargement has been shaped by the institution of the acquis 
communautaire, we maintain that NATO's interest in expansion is not 
entrenched in a similarly constituted institutional context. To provide an 
explanation for enlargement, our argument draws on a Wittgensteinian 
constructivism where meaning and language are central to the constitution of 
identity and interest (Fierke 1998; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Zehfuss 1998). 
Wittgensteinian constructivism provides an important point of departure for the 
analysis that follows. In contrast to sociological constructivists, who often treat 
norms as causes (for a critique see also Checkel in this issue), scholars in this 
tradition have argued that once one enters the realm social action and language, 
norms cannot be reduced to causes. Thus, Friedrich Kratochwil argues, for 
example:
"that our conventional understanding of social action and of the norms governing them 
is defective because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the function of language in 
social interaction, and because of a positivist epistemology that treats norms as 
’causes’. Communication is therefore reduced to issues of describing facts’ properly, 
i.e. to the ’match’ of concepts and objects, and to the ascertainment of nomological 
regularities. Important aspects of social action such as advising, demanding, 
apologizing, promising etc., cannot be adequately understood thereby. Although the 
philosophy of ordinary language has abandoned the ’mirror’ image of language since 




























































































positivism are, nevertheless, still indebted to the old conception." (Kratochwil, 1989,
5-6) [emphasis in text]
Drawing on this opening towards language, our theoretical argument seeks to 
push the constructivist argument further, by examining the process of norm 
construction in the dialectical relationship between context, speech acts, and 
institutional transformation. While the rationalist asks what outcome, given a set 
of preferences, can be expected, we instead ask in what kind of context the 
expansion of NATO and EU would be meaningful and rational.
In other words, we are not looking for a unidirectional relationship 
between preferences and outcomes, but rather at a changing context within 
which identities and interests are mutually constituted through a process of 
interaction. If the meaning of a speech act is dependent on a context, it follows 
logically that, if the context changes, so will the meaning of an act. The purpose 
of this analysis is to reflect on how, given the dramatic change of context 
resulting with the end of the Cold War, the meaning of the Cold War ‘promise’ 
of Helsinki was transformed into a threat. We have chosen to focus on Helsinki 
because it is a promise that transcended both organisations, yet, given its three 
baskets, was related to the mandates of each.
2. SPEEC H  A C TS, CONTEXTUAL CH ANG E AND IN STITU TIO N AL  
INTERESTS
This section outlines the contours of a more extensive empirical research 
programme. Three concepts - speech acts, contextual change, and institutional 
interest - are developed against the background of the Cold War and post-Cold 
War transformations. We use these alternative categories to reconstitute the 
relationship between identity, norms and practices, reinforcing the constructivist 
point regarding the inseparability of identity and interests, and how their mutual 
transformation was constituted out of the dialectical relationship between the 
three concepts. The empirical examples illustrate that the rationality of both 
decisions has to be situated in a context of a priori and changing meanings in 
regard to the identity and norms of the West.
While the EU and NATO are usually studied as separate phenomena, 
there is a historical relationship between the development of their respective 
roles and practices. The creation of western institutions such as the EC and 
NATO in the late 1940s and early 1950s was inspired by a notion of security 
that was both economic and military. The European Coal and Steel Community, 
the first institution of the EC, was set up in the hope of binding the economic 
fate of Germany and France such that they would have a common interest in 




























































































Europe from the Soviet Union. The security provided by the one organisation 
faced inward; the security provided by the other, faced outward. Both notions of 
security formation stress the importance of a border o f order provided by the 
two, which ran through the centre of Europe. Referring to the discourse of 
citizenship as constructing the "border of order," Friedrich Kratochwil argues 
that within a political community the discourse of citizenship creates a border of 
order by defining who is inside and who is outside (Kratochwil 1994). This 
perspective on political community formation, includes the observation that a 
community is more than the sum of its parts. That is, the discourse of citizenship 
reaches beyond the definition of rights. It also creates a notion of belonging, 
which is constructed through practice.8
The ’iron curtain’ represented a border of order for EU and NATO, in so 
far as it played a crucial role in the process of identity formation for both 
organisations. States became members of each and, akin to the political rights of 
citizenship, acquired-qua membership-the right to vote within the order of each 
respective organisation. Through political practice, NATO and EU member 
states have created a notion of belonging to a community within a particular 
order. This order was built on liberal democratic principles that were to a large 
extent established and sustained by negative definition with the other side of the 
iron curtain, the communist east. The specific institutional identities were 
profoundly challenged by the post-Cold War situation. Subsequently, 
enlargement no longer means simply extending membership to a new member 
state; it also means, including what was previously the Other, i.e. including 
members from another type of order. Enlargement in the post cold war context 
hence not only poses the challenge of a missing Other; both organisations also 
face a second challenge of having to incorporate members whose notion of 
belonging developed in a different context. Transgressing the Cold War borders 
of order, therefore, raises the question of belonging anew.
In the context of the Cold War, aside from early talk about the ‘rollback’ 
of Communism, Eastern Europe became the largely forgotten half of Europe, 
invisible against the background of the Soviet Union’s dominating presence. 
The containment policy of NATO, which necessarily involved the U.S., was 
defined primarily in relation to the Soviet Union. Until the period of détente, EC 
policy was largely inward looking, preoccupied with the re-emergence of 
western European economies. The self-definitions and normative ideals of both 
NATO and the EU were defined in opposition to the East. The openness.
8 These practices include two conceptions of practice, one is the republican notion of identity 
formation by way of political debates among citizens (see, for example, Preuss 1995, 
Habermas 1991), the other has been defined as "the conflictive process of establishing the 





























































































democracy and freedom of western societies was contrasted with its closed 
totalitarian neighbour. The articulation of the West’s normative ideals served 
primarily to reinforce its own identity vis à vis the Other.
Prior to détente, there was some hope that the two Germanies would be 
reunified and this was reflected in the failure to recognise the new GDR. This 
hope of obliterating the division of Europe subsided with détente. Eastern and 
western European states created a framework of peaceful coexistence. The 
common principles which would guide their relationship were embodied in the 
three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed by states in both east 
and West in 1975. Expansion was a non-issue; détente cemented the division of 
Europe, granting Communist regimes in the East a legitimacy they had not 
previously enjoyed. Nonetheless, the Helsinki process was highly politicised 
from the start, as states in each bloc selectively interpreted the document (Bloed, 
1990: 283). Western states emphasised western values, and in particular the 
primacy of human rights, while eastern states emphasised disarmament 
provisions, non-interference in their affairs and the hope of economic aid. For 
the West, Helsinki represented the embodiment of western ideals of the free 
flow of information people, and goods across the division of Europe as well as 
the possibility of greater respect for human rights. The ‘promise’ articulated in 
the human rights basket of the Final Act first came back to haunt the eastern 
European communist regimes, during the last part of the Cold War, and later, 
after its end, western institutions. In what follows, we articulate the theoretical 
relationship between speech acts, contextual change and the challenge to 
institutional identity by reflecting on the ‘promise’ of Helsinki.
Speech Acts: The Prom ise o f Helsinki
An article in NATO Review titled the ‘Implementation of the Final act of the 
CSCE,’(1975) referred to the significance of the document as follows (see also, 
Luns 1976,
The ultimate significance of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, depends on the degree to 
which all its provisions are implemented by all the participants. Although the Final 
Act does not, in Western eyes, have the force of law and its implementation is 
voluntary, there is nevertheless a strong moral obligation on signatories to translate its 
promises into reality (emphasis added).
The significance of the Final Act lay less in the force of law than in constructing 
a moral obligation. The goal was to translate the promise of Helsinki into reality.
This promise is an example of a speech act. There is a long tradition of 



























































































relations literature.9 Several ideas at the core of this theory are relevant to our 
analysis. First, certain categories of speech are not simply descriptive or 
conveying information, but are acts in and of themselves. Acts of this kind are 
referred to as ‘performatives.’ Saying something is doing something (Kratochwil 
1989, 8). For instance, when someone says ‘I do’ in the context of marriage, 
they undertake an act which has a range of moral and legal consequences; the 
act constitutes the marriage, or brings it into being. The second point, which 
flows from this, is that speech acts are dependent on a context for their meaning. 
The meaning of a promise in the context of a marriage is quite different than a 
promise to pick up clothes at the cleaner or the promise of Helsinki. It is by 
virtue of the context, that acts, such as promises or threats have illocutionary 
force and prelocutionary effects. The two can be distinguished by the force of 
variously promising, ordering, threatening, and the meaning attached to these 
actions, as opposed to the effect of promising, forcing or frightening on the 
addressee, or the bringing about of effects on an audience (Levinson 1983, 236). 
Both the illocutionary force and prelocutionary effects are dependent on context. 
The third point, which is somewhat less obvious, is that speech acts do not 
necessarily presuppose any face-to-face communication between communicants. 
All that matters is that the content of the speech act is conveyed from one party 
to another. If state X targets its missiles on state Y, for instance, a threat may be 
communicated, even if the threat was not spoken.10 The propositional content of 
a promise or threat may also be conveyed through public discourse toward 
another, rather than in a direct face-to-face exchange. In this light, it is perfectly 
reasonable to understand the commitment of states, in the context of the 
Helsinki Final Act, as the expression of a speech act of ‘promising’ to 
undertake a range of activities. This promise was communicated both to other 
states involved in the process and to their respective publics.
The human rights example is particularly interesting for examining the 
relationship between speech act and context. The illocutionary force and 
perlocutationary effect of the eastern promise to respect human rights 
manifested itself on two levels, that is, toward eastern European citizens’ 
initiatives, who pointed out the discrepancy between the promise and 
corresponding acts by eastern governments, and western countries, who, given 
the priority attached to human rights, encouraged the dissident eastern 
Europeans. By 1976 and 1977 the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR) in 
Poland and the Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, were pointing out the discrepancy 
between the promise of eastern governments to respect human rights and the 
abusive treatment they were receiving for exposing violations. In this respect,
9 See: Austin 1962, Searle 1969, Levinson 1983 and Duffy, Frederking and Tucker 1998, 
Kratochwil 1989, Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde 1998.





























































































eastern citizen’s initiatives magnified the moral obligation which the promise 
entailed.
Western countries reinforced this breach of promise by referring back to 
Helsinki. For instance, in response to the Declaration of Martial Law in Poland 
in December 1981, the Special Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council 
stated that "The process of renewal and reform which began in Poland in August 
1980 was watched with sympathy and hope by all who believe in freedopi and 
self-determination; it resulted from a genuine effort by the overwhelming 
majority of the Polish people to achieve a more open society in accordance with 
the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki.”11 The West not only recognised the 
role of the Helsinki Principles in encouraging this dissidence, but also the 
commitment to recognise the right of individuals to help in ensuring full 
implementation,12 and the responsibility of the West toward those attempting to 
uphold ‘western’ ideals. As Lord Carrington (1983) stated:
We must face squarely the complex moral and political dilemmas which developments 
in Eastern Europe pose for the West. Whatever we do, the Soviet Union will accuse us 
of subverting these countries. They are bound to say this because they cannot 
contemplate the enormity of their own failure in the area. Free societies have a power 
of attraction of which it would be perverse to be ashamed, and we should not be afraid 
to subvert by example. Our prime concern must be for the peoples of these countries 
themselves. We have a historical duty, and a political and moral responsibility to 
uphold their right to freedom and self-determination (emphasis added).
In making this statement, Carrington emphasised that the West should not 
encourage revolution in the East, but rather reform. Consistent with détente, the 
goal was not to overturn the eastern order (and therefore the western border of 
order) but to open it up so that the people there might live under freer 
conditions. The recognition of a moral obligation toward the eastern dissidents 
who were exposing the eastern failure to abide by its promise of human rights, 
manifests a further illocutionary force in this context. The praise of eastern 
human rights dissidents was situated again and again within a larger argument 
about the need for western activists who were questioning their own 
government’s policies in the area of disarmament, to recognise what precisely 
NATO, in particular, was defending, i.e. western ideals of democracy and 
human rights (Levi 1982, de Carmoy 1982, Carrington, 1983, Defois 1984). In 
both of these respects, the promise of Helsinki, articulated in the context of the 
Cold War, served primarily to reinforce the border of order separating East and 
West.
11 Special Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, 11 January 1982, ‘Declaration of 
Events in Poland,’ NATO Review, (1982), p. 28




























































































Changing C ontexts, Changing M eaning
From 1989 to 1991, the political landscape of Europe was transformed with the 
dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the 
Soviet Union. Both the EU and NATO were forced to redefine their identities as 
a result. For the European Union, the dramatic changes accompanying the end of 
the Cold War created pressures to expand the community at a time when it had 
been preparing to further ‘deepen’ the integration of existing members. For 
NATO, as a military alliance, designed for the defence of the West within the 
Cold War, the key issue in the immediate aftermath was less whether NATO 
would expand than whether the Alliance was necessary in the absence of its 
former antagonist (Lubkemeier 1991; Ando 1993). Against the background of a 
series of unanticipated changes that raised questions about the future identity of 
both organisations, past promises became one of the stable features in an 
otherwise uncertain situation. These promises were reinforced by the 
conceptualisation of the end of the Cold War as a ‘victory’ for liberal 
democracy, capitalism, and western values. Dissidents had acted in the name of 
liberal democratic principles. Western leaders had recognised their 
responsibility to those upholding their ideals. With the collapse of communism, 
the West declared a victory. Each of these factors contributed to a 
transformation - once the context had changed - of promises from the past into 
threats. At this point we emphasise the eastern European context; in the next 
section, we return to an analysis of the two western organisations.
With the end of the Cold War, the CEECs referred to their liberation from 
Communism as a return to an original state, for instance, a return to the natural 
geographical and historical boundaries of Europe (Melescanu 1993), or a return 
to democracy, after a historical detour, and a return to capitalism and to history 
(Jeszenszky 1992). This ideal healthy state was not primarily a geographical or 
physical category, however; it was normative. As Romanian Foreign Minister 
Melescanu stated: 'today’s Europe is to be found where its democratic, liberal 
and humanist values and practices succeed in shutting the door on the nightmare 
of authoritarian regimes, command economies, and a disregard for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” (Melescanu 1993, 13). The model for this ideal 
healthy state was a set of shared western values going back to the Enlightenment 
and the democratic revolutions of the eighteen century. The problem in the years 
following the collapse was that western Europe wasn’t doing enough to 
contribute to this outcome and in fact appeared to be isolating itself behind a 
new cordon sanitaire from the problems of post-Cold War Europe (Suchocka 
1993, 6). The Cold War victor, who had challenged eastern bloc leaders to tear 
down the walls that kept eastern Europeans in, appeared, in the immediate 




























































































The western effort to reconstruct a new border of order flew in the face of 
everything the central and eastern Europeans had expected from the West. 
Vaclav Havel, speaking before NATO in the early 1990s, presented this 
expectation and, like Lord Carrington earlier, the responsibility that flowed from 
it:
The democratic West ... was for years offering sympathies to the democratic forces in 
the countries of the Soviet bloc. ... The protection of democracy and human liberty to 
which it has been committed has given encouragement and inspiration to citizens of 
our countries, too. ... The determination to resist evil has been a source of hope for 
millions of people who had to live under a yoke. Because of that, the West bears a 
tremendous responsibility. ... To the West, whose civilisation is based on universal 
values, the fate of the East cannot be a matter o f indifference for reasons of principle, 
and for practical reasons either. Instability, poverty, misfortune and disorder in the 
countries that have rid themselves of despotic rule could threaten the West just as the 
arms arsenals of the former despotic governments did. (Havel 1991, 35, emphasis 
added).
The West, and its institutions, represented a normative ideal. The CEECs were 
encouraged to act in accordance with these ideals in resisting totalitarianism. 
Now that ‘containment’ of the Soviet Union was no longer necessary, the West 
had a responsibility to assist the CEECs in the recovery, to assist them in 
upholding these values. Havel’s appeal to western responsibility mirrored 
Carrington’s recognition of this responsibility a decade earlier.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, democracy was presented as a cure for 
eastern ailments, but, given the painful nature of the reforms, and the unhealed 
wounds reopened by the spirit of freedom, democracy would potentially give 
rise to - and by 1993 had given rise to - social unrest and national conflict, most 
notably in former Yugoslavia where war had broken out (Gazdag 1992). The 
West had encouraged the adoption of ideals, had celebrated the hope and 
possibility of prosperity and democracy, but the prescribed cure, rather than 
contributing to recovery, was exacerbating tensions. The EU was accused of 
only a lukewarm response to eastern problems, and NATO of isolating itself 
behind a new cordon sanitaire from the problems confronted by the CEECs 
since the fall of communism (Suchocka 1993).
The existence of norms supporting Eastward enlargement was dramatised 
by Central and Eastern Europeans who pointed to the discrepancy between 
western promises and actions.
The Cold War promise to Eastern Europe became, in a new context, a 
threat of instability should the West fail to act. But the threat went even deeper. 
As we will argue in the next section, a failure to act on the promise became a 




























































































Redefining Interests: The Challenge to Institutional Identity
The point of the last section was to illustrate how actors used the past promises 
of states to hold up a mirror to current practices. The mirror was first held up to 
the eastern European regimes, who in signing the Helsinki Final Act, promised 
to respect human rights and then proceeded to abuse the rights of dissidents who 
- morally supported by western governments - pointed out the discrepancy. In 
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, these same dissidents, many of whom 
had become state leaders, held a mirror up to western governments, arguing that 
they, as the embodiment of the victory of liberal ideals in the Cold War, had a 
responsibility to those they had encouraged to adopt those ideals. These 
processes of mirroring provide a point of departure for rethinking the role of 
norms in processes of interest transformation.
Rationalist theories cannot account for the significance of acts of 
exposing a discrepancy. If individuals or states are understood to be purely self- 
regarding egoists, there is no need to keep one’s promises since the 
maximisation of one’s own interests, regardless of others, is key. Promise­
keeping becomes extremely important, however, if one’s identity and ability to 
act are understood to be fundamentally social and, therefore, dependent on the 
recognition of others. The shame or disrespect that comes from failure to live up 
to previously stated norms or ideals is only experienced in relation to others’ 
recognition that normative expectations have been dashed. As Honneth (1995: 
259) points out, it is not in the positive affirmation of norms that one’s 
constitutive dependence on recognition from others is evident, but in the 
inability to continue with action once confronted with the discrepancy. The 
ability of states or alliances to act is as dependent on the positive recognition of 
identity as it is for individuals. Both rely on some measure of acceptance of an 
alignment between ideals or moral argument and practice. In the aftermath of 
the Cold War the CEECs were seeking recognition from the West. But western 
identity was also dependent on recognition. Too great an inconsistency between 
the normative ideals which the West represented and its practices toward the 
CEECs would be damaging to the identity of the EU and NATO, not to mention 
those elites in the CEECs who were attempting to provide a democratic carrot 
rather than a nationalist stick (Allin 1995). The institutional challenge took a 
somewhat different form for the two organisations, however.
In the case of the EU, the prospect of inclusion by way of enlargement 
was offered to all European states that shared the goals of the EC (Preamble to 
Single European Act, 1987). The responsibility of Europe as a whole, to 
increasingly speak in one voice and the necessity for all democratic European 




























































































constitutionally entrenched with the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 
1991 which states that ”[A]ny European State may apply to become a member 
of the Union” (Article O, TEU). The promise was enhanced in the "Conclusions 
of the Presidency" at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, which stipulated 
that "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for protection of minorities."13 The Amsterdam Treaty restates the intention of 
enlargement and explicitly the democratic condition, stipulating that "[A]ny 
European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6( 1) may apply to 
become a member of the Union. (Article 49 TEU) [Article O]."14 The promise of 
enlargement is hence firmly expressed in the Treaty, on the condition that the 
candidates are European states, governed democratically, and based on the 
principle of law.
The key issue in the current context of EU enlargement is less the 
uniqueness of adding new members than the changing context in which it takes 
place. While the sheer number of accession candidates plays a role in the 
complexity of this process, to be sure, we argue that the absence of the Cold 
War border of order, has influenced how this process proceeds.15 Candidate 
states have historically been required to accept the acquis communautaire in 
joining. The same is true in the current membership negotiations. However, an 
accession of this size and scope poses a challenge to the institutional capacities 
of the EU. It hence requires a reshuffling of the EU's institutional balance before 
accession can proceed. The 1996-97 intergovernmental conference at 
Amsterdam (IGC) postponed a decision in this respect, however, no later than 
the point when EU membership would exceed the number of 20.16 As one 
observer remarked, it was not obvious why 20 members should come to an
13 Bulletin of the European Communities 6, 1993, point 1.13.
14 See also: Article 6, paras. 1, 2, TEU stipulates ”1. The Union is founded on the principles 
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law, principles which are common to the Member States. 2. The Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law.”.
15 Past accessions have not involved more than a few countries at a time. By contrast, now, 
with the Cold War over, expansion will potentially incorporate up to fourteen new countries 
which is almost double the current membership. Ten candidate countries are from Central and 
Eastern Europe including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
16 On the IGC's failure to prepare the EU's institutional balance for enlargement, see 





























































































agreement that 15 could not reach.17 At any rate, the unresolved question of 
institutional balance at Amsterdam does present a hurdle in the enlargement 
process. To postpone the decision reflects a creeping insecurity in handling the 
process among EU member states. Effectively, this insecurity means a gradual 
move away from previous promises of enlargement that were uttered in the cold 
war context. This new stress on the conditions for enlargement, rather than the 
promise to do so, suggests that the EU is now less ready to take on the 
responsibility it had assigned for itself earlier when eastern enlargement was not, 
yet, in sight.
Indeed, more recent documents point to the development of a policy of 
conditionality which involves adding conditions for enlargement. One such 
condition regards, for example, a respect of minorities; candidates have to 
comply with this condition before joining the club. While the condition as such 
fits well into the shared norms of liberal democracy, it is striking that while 
respect for minority rights is a condition to be accepted by the eastern candidates 
of the EU, it is not explicitly mentioned in the acquis communautaire to which 
the western members have adhered. We can, therefore speak of hurdles being 
constructed for eastern candidate countries. There is a clear tension between 
promises of the past, and the slow emergence of present concerns. This shift was 
expressed during the Austrian Council Presidency of the EU at the beginning of 
actual accession negotiations with individual candidate countries on 10 
November 1998. With the actual accession in view, worries about EU security, 
human rights, minority politics, and threats to EU employment security have led 
to an increasing number of key political actors to caution against enlarging too 
rapidly.
For example, on 1 July 1998, the Austrian Council President, foreign 
Minister Wolfgang SchUssel stressed, that "concern is now mounting that the 
date for the enlargement of the EU to take in countries from eastern European 
and Cyprus will be put back as the countries concerned struggle to meet EU 
standards."18 19 While negotiations were formally opened under the British 
presidency over a whole series of policy areas, Mr SchUssel warned that not only 
would the new countries have to make strenuous efforts but the EU would have 
to undertake major reforms before enlargement could go ahead. He said that 
"Even the Union itself is currently not yet in any fit state to take in new 
members."'9 And, later in the process, supporting Chancellor Victor Klima, 
Austrian MEP Hannes Swoboda stressed that "not only Austrians but also 
people in the candidate countries were anticipating this project of the century
17 See: European Policy Center, September 1997, http://europa.eu.int/en/apenda/i pc- 
home/instdoc/universe/europe.htm. p. 1 and p. 2 respectively.
18 see: EP NEWS. July 1998, p. 1




























































































(EU enlargement) with concern. It would be irresponsible to forcefully push 
both EU and the candidate countries towards hastened enlargement." At the 
same time, the beginning of the accession negotiations were praised as a 
"historical day", as an achievement that had been "a particular concern of the 
Austrian presidency" according to Council President Wolfgang Schiissel. As 
Schiissel stressed, the accession conferences beginning in Vienna signify the 
"return to Europe of Hungary and other eastern European partners after more 
than eighty years of the breakdown of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchic."20
With the German EU Presidency since January 1999 the main hurdle to 
compliance with previous promises has become the financial burden of 
enlargement. Next to the issue of 'institutions', 'minority rights', and 'security', 
'money' now appears to be the major constraint in the process of enlargement. 
Instead of speaking with one voice seeking to include the newly democratised 
central and eastern European states in the project of European integration, the 
EU member states appear to be quarrelling amongst themselves over who has to 
bear the financial brunt of eastern enlargement. The German ministry of state 
raises suspicion that other member states have high hopes for the Germans to 
"pay it all" (Die Woche, 5 February 1999, p. 21). But quite to the contrary, the 
"favorite toy of the Germans is now the calculator" (ibid.), and it is clear that 
without successful budgetary reforms, enlargement is not likely to happen any 
time soon. Chancellor Gerhard Schroder of Germany, for example, paints a dire 
picture of European integration, lest the financial burden is reshuffled, pointing 
out that "(T)he century of European integration will see little success if burden­
sharing is not distributed on a more equal basis." (Die Woche, 8 January 1999) 
Despite these financial constraints, the German Presidency of the EU continues 
to reassure the CEECs with statements about the duty to enlargement. As 
German Secretary of State and President of the Council of Ministers of the EU, 
Joschka Fischer states:
"After the Cold War the EU must not be limited to Western Europe, instead, at its core 
the idea of European integration is an all-European project. Geopolitical realities do 
not allow for a serious alternative anyhow. If this is true, then history has already 
decided about the i f  of eastern enlargement, even though the how' and \vhen’ remain 
to be designed and decided." (Die Zeit, 21 January 1999, p. 3)
The at times contradictory comments on enlargement as a historical opportunity 
to reintegrate the eastern European countries, on the one hand, and, a concern of 
the West regarding issues of security, institutions, and finance, on the other, 
point to the conflicting interests in the context of the enlargement discussion. 
An EU identity that is based on western democratic principles, and the related





























































































promise of enlargement, is at odds with emerging practical policy problems. A 
discursive analysis reveals that continuity in the enlargement process, despite 
frequently raised concerns, can be explained in terms of an EU identity that is 
rooted in shared norms and values. The strong emphasis on the norms 
structuring EU policy strategy was expressed in the European Parliament’s 
Oostlander Report in which the author cautioned against "manoeuvring" aimed 
at postponing the opening of negotiations until there are precise details about the 
cost of enlargement. With too much manoeuver, the author maintains 
"enlargement will never take place."21
The issues raised by the dramatic end of the Cold War were somewhat 
different for NATO. As a military alliance, designed for the defence of the West 
within the Cold War, the key issue in the immediate aftermath was less whether 
NATO would expand than whether the Alliance was necessary in the absence of 
its former antagonist. Lacking the institutional equivalent of the EU acquis in 
regards to new members, the idea that NATO should expand was far from 
apparent. While the end of the Cold War brought the relationship between 
widening and deepening back on the EU’s political agenda, the military security 
question was initially less one about expansion than about the relationship 
between NATO and the larger OSCE, which already included the CEECs. 
NATO had ‘won’ the Cold War, but, despite this apparent success, its 
continuing relevance was being called into question. The central problem was 
the reluctance of publics and parliaments on both sides of the Atlantic to direct 
resources to the organisation in the absence of any apparent threat (Lubkemeier, 
1991; Ando, 1993). Neither NATO nor the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe assumed from the beginning that NATO would militarily expand to the 
East. Through a series of moves over several years the expansion became 
inevitable. The motor of this transformation was the conflict between two 
promises.
In the last section, we explored how the CEECs gave meaning to their 
struggle for recognition by the West during this period. The CEECs argued that 
failure to expand would give rise to disorder. By contrast, one of NATO’s 
arguments against military expansion was that it would arouse fears in Russia 
that the West sought domination over its former enemy and exacerbate 
xenophobic sentiments and a reluctance to proceed with cuts in defence 
spending on the part of the Russian population (Taylor 1991; Holst 1992). 
Russia had articulated its opposition to the expansion of NATO but then made a 
surprise move in August 1993 in signing the Russian-Polish declaration which 
granted Poland leave to join the Alliance. Yeltsin’s act was viewed hopefully by 
the CEECs, but not in Russia. Instead, ‘non-democratic’ forces interpreted the
21 See Together in Europe. European Union Newsletter for Central Europe, No 88, May 1st, 




























































































possibility of NATO expansion as a move to re-establish the Cold War and 
isolate Russia (Ignatenko 1994; Sturua 1994).
The strong Russian reaction created some nervousness in the West, which 
was reflected in NATO’s Brussels Summit in January 1994. Faced with pressure 
from the CEECs to join the Alliance, and with the prospect that a decision to 
expand would mobilise nationalist forces in Russia, NATO mapped a middle 
course by creating the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The PfP would make it 
possible to delay the decision about expansion but, at the same time, would 
allow the CEECs to prepare for such an eventuality. While the West initially 
sought to mollify nationalist and communist forces in Russia through the PfP, 
the CEECs, concerned about the same development, emphasised the promise of 
the Partnership to prepare candidates for future membership. The Polish 
Minister of Defence Kolodziejcyk referred to the January Summit and the 
proclamation of the PfP by the Alliance: ‘We expect and would welcome NATO 
expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East...’ He further stated 
that Poland undertook the Partnership as ‘the best route towards it goal of full 
integration in the Alliance’ (Kolodziejcyk 1994). Poland drew on the promise of 
the FTP to press Polish interests.
At the beginning of 1994 NATO said there would be no immediate 
enlargement. By mid-1994, after Clinton’s speech in Warsaw, momentum had 
shifted towards enlargement.22
At the December 1994 Brussels meeting of NATO foreign ministers, a 
decision was made to proceed with expansion. The enlargement of NATO was 
placed in the context of building a European security architecture which would 
extend to the whole of Europe. While enlargement was initially avoided out of 
fear that it would recreate the division of Europe, by 1996 it was said to have 
rendered the idea of dividing lines in Europe ‘obsolete’ (Moltke 1996). Any 
distinctions between countries as a result of expansion would be ‘contours’ 
indicating ‘degrees of difference’ rather than dividing lines. By developing a 
‘true partnership’ with Russia and making a conceptual linkage between the 
enlargement of the EU and NATO, the expansion was to communicate the 
parallelism of integration and co-operation: the integration of new members and
22 The American congress and public opinion were once again asking why they should 
continue to invest in the Alliance, given the failure to take effective action in Bosnia (Sloan 
1994; Aspin 1994). At the same time. Alliance countries were faced with major cuts in 
defence spending and renewed questions about the relevance and need for NATO in the 
absence of a Soviet threat (Bruce 1994; Sloan 1994; Rose 1994). Expansion was the answer to 
these problems. The desire of the CEECs to join the Alliance became proof of its continuing 




























































































the deepening of co-operation with those nations who are not, or not yet, ready 
or willing to join (Voigt 1996).
Like past applicants to the EU, the CEECs viewed membership in the two 
organisations as part of the same package. Even though the initial concern of the 
CEECs was an economic one, the challenge was raised to both organisations. 
Through a series of incremental decisions, not least of which was the creation of 
the PfP, the Visegrad countries emphasised those parts of the promise which 
would contribute to their eventual membership. Once a decision had been made 
to include the Visegrad countries, the threat began to focus on a more traditional 
security concern and the promise to avoid new ‘spheres of influence’ in Europe, 
as leaders of the Baltic states pointed to promises by American leaders that ‘No 
nation in Europe should ever again be consigned to a buffer zone between great 
powers or related to another nation’s ‘sphere of influence.’23 The problem 
NATO presently faces is the conflict between its promise to expand to the Baltic 
states and its promise of genuine partnership with Russia, which opposes a 
further wave of expansion.
While NATO’s interests may have originally been driven by a survival 
concern, the contradictions of the present situation open up two alternatives 
which are contrary to this interest, in so far as survival, in this case, is primarily 
a question of institutional relevance rather than military. The one is to transform 
the survival problem into one of military survival by respecting the promise to 
the Baltic states at the expense of its promise to Russia of genuine partnership. 
The other is to deepen the partnership with Russia at which point NATO’s 
identity, and therefore survival as NATO, may become doubtful; the deeper the 
co-operation with Russia the less need there is for an organisation focusing on 
the North Atlantic area as opposed to a pan-European security organisation, such 
as the OSCE.24
In conclusion, it is interesting to look at the relationship between 
contextual changes, normative ideals and institutional expansion for each of the 
three players, EU, NATO and the CEECs respectively. This approach provides 
insight into the rationale for the expansion of both western organisations by 
placing them in a changing intersubjective context, which has been transformed 
through the interaction of the different players. The changing context, while 
more dramatic for the CEECs than the West, constructed the possibility for the 
former to articulate two compatible interests, ie. inclusion in both NATO and the 
EU, while it created conflicting interests for both western organisations. The 
changing context disrupted the future plans of the EU and NATO, presenting an 
entirely new situation to which they had to respond. In order to maintain the
23 See Warren Christopher, as quoted in: Stankevicius 1996; see also Golob 1996




























































































identity as victor in the Cold War, western institutions had to act with some 
semblance of consistency with the normative ideals they represented. The 
promise of prosperity and democracy were stable and constant features against a 
backdrop of material disarray. The CEECs drew on these normative ideals to 
pressure the West to keep their promises. While failing to provide the massive 
assistance reminiscent of the Marshall Plan, both the EU and NATO did 
reinforce the promise of eventual inclusion. By making the CEECs responsible 
for their own readiness to join, the West also provided a carrot that would 
hopefully dampen the conflicting tendencies toward disintegration in the East. 
The promise constituted the possibility of expansion. Against the background of 
a dramatically changed context, the CEECs transformed the promise into a 
threat, making maximum use of their compatible interests in expansion by both 
institutions. By contrast, NATO and the EU were pulled toward expansion 
against the background of conflicting interests.
3 TH E CH ALLENG E OF EASTERN EN L AR G E M E NT AND THE  
C O NSTRUCTIVIST RESEARCH PRO G RAM M E
The comparison of EU and NATO expansion provides insight into the 
expansion process in a way that an analysis of either organisation, in and of 
itself, cannot. Based on this brief comparison of the two cases of enlargement 
politics we have argued that an explanation of both processes, against the odds, 
requires embedding these policy decisions in a normative order which does not 
exclude the EU’s acquis but is larger and encompasses NATO as well. When 
embedded in this larger normative order, moves by NATO and the EU to 
redefine their interests regarding expansion can be understood as emerging out 
of the tension between past promises and on-going practice in a context of 
dramatic change, which, in the absence of the old border of order, constituted a 
challenge to the Cold War identities of the two institutions. To this end, we 
examined a process of norm construction which preceded the critical juncture of 
the end of the Cold War. In doing so, our analysis fits squarely within the 
constructivist debate but pushes further. We elaborate the relationship between 
norms, practices and identity, and how interests were transformed in the 
dialectical relationship between the three.
The constructivist emphasis on identities, norms and practices provides an 
important point of departure for understanding the expansion process; at the 
same time, we note that this literature has not sufficiently addressed issues 
raised by a context of dramatic change where the ‘other’ disappears or 
undergoes significant transformation. Building on the strengths and expanding 
on the weaknesses of this tradition, our argument includes the following 




























































































process going back to the construction of norms during the Cold War. The key 
issue is how the meaning of speech acts embodying these norms changed with 
the end of the Cold War, and how this constructed the conditions for eastern 
enlargement. The argument rests on a dialectical relationship between context, 
speech acts and institutional change. The rationality of moves by either 
organisations has to be situated in a context of past meanings.
Second, we emphasise that context and speech acts are explicitly 
intersubjective. As a result, we assume the importance of the meanings actors 
bring to their own actions and the material world around them. This points to 
one other crucial element that has not been adequately addressed in some of the 
constructivist literature, that is, the role of language. The reluctance to take 
language seriously undoubtedly relates to a widespread acceptance of the realist 
assumption that the primary speech act of diplomats is the lie and that states will 
break promises if it is in their interest to do so. The following turns the realist 
argument about language on its head, analysing ‘promises’ as a specific form of 
action, and looking at processes by which the two institutions were held to 
account for their promises and normative ideals.
Third, if meaning is dependent on context, it follows logically that, as a 
context changes, so will the meaning of acts. We argue that the promise of 
western institutions, held out to the former eastern bloc during the Cold War, 
was transformed into a threat, by both east and West, with the dismantling of the 
European division and the Soviet Union. This new threat gave rise to a 
conclusion that the CEECs could not be excluded, over the long term, from 
western organisations. If western acts were not consistent with past promises, 
the consequence would be a loss of popular support for democratic institutions 
and a free market economy, which would exacerbate nationalist tensions and 
ethnic rivalries in the region creating a security threat for the West. The threat 
not only took the form of potential instability in the East, however; the failure to 
fulfil the promise, and the exposure of this failure, presented a threat to the 
identity of the two organisations.
Karin Fierke
Nuffield College, Oxford 0X1 INF, United Kingdom, 
karin.fierke@nuffield.oxford.ac.uk
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